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ABSTRACT      
The paper argues for conceptualising technology as a socio-technical ensemble which emerges from the 
socio-political context of the organisation. This perspective is used to inform a case study carried out within a 
consumer goods company, where the focus is upon the configuration of work and technology associated with the 
job of sales representative. It is argued that the acquiescence and compliance of the sales reps is to be understood 
primarily on the basis of senior management‟s effective deployment of its power resource through  „enacting the 
environment‟, the configuration and utilisation of the ensemble, and its employment strategy. „Closure‟and 
„stabilisation‟ had occurred, and the ensemble was operating on a number of levels. 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The argument that technology plays an important role in the exercise of power is not a new one.  
It is not possible to separate the „purely technical‟ aspects of power from the „purely social‟, 
and as a result the unit of analysis is not merely the combination of social and technical factors, 
but the „socio technical ensemble‟: 
Each time the „social institution‟ is written as short hand for „socio technical ensemble‟ we 
should be able to spell out the technical relations that go into stabilising that institution. Society 
is not determined by technology, nor is technology determined by society. Both emerge as two 
sides of the socio technical coin during the construction processes of artefacts, facts and 
                                                          
1. Data collection took place over a two year time period, and involved around fifty 
semi-structured interviews with a range of managers and staff from all levels of the 
organization; participant observation (for example, attendance at monthly meetings between 
sales reps and Area Managers); and the examination of company documentation. 
relevant social groups. 
2
 
Bijker 
3
 has made an important contribution to „social construction of technology‟ (SCOT) 
theorizing through the incorporation of a politics of technology: 
My argument for a politics of technology involves three steps. First I will argue that a 
constructivist analysis, in some form, is a conditio sine qua non for such a politics. Such an 
analysis stresses the malleability of technology and the possibility for choice, the basic insight 
that things could have been otherwise. But technology is not always malleable, it can also be 
obdurate, hard and very fixed. The second step is to analyse this obduracy of socio technical 
ensembles, to see what limits it sets to our politics. 
4
 
The argument, then,  is that if technology is socially constructed, the process of construction is an outcome of the 
exercise of power, the political process. If an organisation is considered as a constellation of relevant groups, each 
of which has a particular technological frame, then political behaviour will centre around attempts to achieve 
ascendancy for a particular technological frame.  Often, those groups which already have more power are the most 
successful in this process, which can be likened to the formation of a „dominant ideology‟. 5 
The organisation can thus be viewed as an socio technical ensemble, embodying a web 
of relationships between individuals, groups, technology and the internal and external contexts. 
The ensemble is dynamic, around which organisational power flows, shaping and molding it. 
The paper explores this circulation of power through data gathered from a longitudinal case 
study,  focusing on technology as a conduit of power. 
 
INTERPRETING TECHNOLOGY 
 The majority of theories of technology attribute at least some degree of influence to 
social processes in the construction of technology. As Grint and Woolgar 
6
 note, there is no 
evidence of „hard determinism‟ within social scientific writing and research, this being limited 
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to the more populist managerialist publications. Understanding the process of social 
construction is thus of major import in understanding how a recognisable technology comes 
into being. The social construction perspective focuses attention upon attempts to shape  
technology in particular ways, whilst at the same time also examining how technology shapes 
particular forms of social knowledge 
7
. 
 The emergence of social shaping approaches was associated with a shift of academic 
interest in this area from the sociology of scientific knowledge (which focuses upon how 
scientific theories are socially shaped) to the sociology of technology 
8
. As a result, the basic 
themes of the sociology of scientific knowledge, which Bijker, Hughes and Pinch 
9
 term „the 
empirical programme of relativism (EPOR), were inherited by the social construction of 
technology perspective. The SCOT approach seeks to problematise the emergence of particular 
technologies in order to question the ways in which they emerged.  
 Bijker 
10
 views the SCOT approach as „socio technical‟ as the elements analysed are 
both social and technical: 
Purely social relations are to be found only in the imaginations of sociologists or amongst 
baboons, and purely technical relations are to be found only in the wilder reaches of science 
fiction. The technical is socially constructed and the social is technically constructed. All stable 
ensembles are bound together as much by the technical as by the social. 
11
 
The development of  technology involves an alternation between variation and selection, and 
thus needs to be studied via a „multidirectional‟ model. Typically, in the development of a 
particular technological artefact,  many forms and variations of the artefact appear. With the 
multidirectional model it is possible to ask why some variants „die‟ whilst others „survive‟. 12 
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An emphasis is placed upon the relevant social groups who define the „problem‟ for which the 
artefact is intended to be a „solution‟, and the understandings and meanings attributed  by them: 
The use of the concept of the relevant social group is quite straightforward. The phrase is used 
to denote institutions and organisations (such as the military or some specific industrial 
company), as well as organised or unorganised groups of individuals. The key requirement is 
that all members of a certain social group share the same set of meanings, attached to a specific 
artefact. In deciding which social groups are relevant, we must first ask whether the artefact has 
any meaning at all for the members of the social group under investigation. Obviously, the 
social group of „customers‟ or „users‟ of the artefact fulfils this requirement. But less obvious 
social groups may need to be included. 
13
  
A key concern of the SCOT approach is to show how a particular technology becomes 
„stabilised‟ or „closed‟.  These terms are used to describe the critical junctures at which a 
technology-organisation configuration is 'frozen' 
14
, in the sense that 'the interpretive flexibility 
of any given technology is not infinite, being partly constrained by the material characteristics 
of that technology'. 
15
 There are a number of mechanisms by which this is possible, including 
„rhetorical‟ closure,  involving the disappearance of the „problems‟ surrounding the artefact 
(that is, the „problems‟ are „solved‟), and the redefinition of the problem. 
 The construction of a technology should not, however, be seen as an exclusively 
political process, as other factors limit the possibilities for action, such as current working 
practices,  organisation structures, and, not least, existing organisational technology: 
with most technologies...their organisational adoption and adaptation shape them in specific 
ways. That is, they are not simply applied to organisations. Rather, there is a complex process 
whereby the technological possibilities open to a specific organisation are constructed, 
mobilised and assessed. And further, the way in which this process of construction and 
assessment develops is critically influenced by existing organisational practices, structures and 
cultures. In other words, the use of any technology is the result of complex decision-making 
processes which do not simply flow from the given state of markets and technologies. Rather, 
those decision-making processes are crucially dependent on habituated practices and relations 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Sociology of History and Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987) 
13. T. Pinch & W. Bijker, (op. cit., pp31-32) 
14.
 T. Pinch & W. Bijker (op. cit.) 
15.
 W. Orlikowski „The duality of technology: rethinking the concept of technology in 
organisations‟, Organisational Science, 3, 1992, pp398-427. 
of power between diverse specialisms in organisations. 
16
 
 Technology, then, is socially created and shaped by the ideas, interests, objectives of, 
and interactions between, designers, technologists, engineers and other actors. 
17
 This happens 
from the earliest stages of the creation and design of the technology in the design laboratory or 
software engineering department. 
18
 There continue to be opportunities for the technology to 
be shaped during the period when it is being introduced into an adopting organisation and, 
indeed, during everyday utilisation. Fleck has termed this latter process 'innofusion', others talk 
about 'post-adoption innovation'. 
19
 Prima facie, it would appear likely that some actors and 
groups will  have more opportunity than others to shape the social-technical ensemble during 
implementation and utilisation, and this is one reason why it is important to know who has 
those opportunities, and their orientations towards work, the organisation, people and 
technology. 
20
 The later that particular actors enter the technology 
creation-design-implementation-configuration-utilisation process, the less opportunity they 
can be expected to have to influence the technology-organisation configuration. Or, to put the 
matter a little differently, the later the phase, the narrower the 'design space'. 
21
 
 Thus, a social creation/construction theorisation of technology is compatible with a 
perspective which sees the technology as itself making a difference. Technology-in-use has, at 
any given point in time, a fixed material character which presents itself to people who may 
wish to use or modify it: 
at critical junctures during the process of change, for example through particular design 
decisions over architectures or choices of technology concerning their implementation, the key 
technical features of a given engineering system become 'frozen' into a specific form...whereby 
the form of an artefact is 'stabilised' as consensus emerges among key social groups with a stake 
in the design process... these technical influences subsequently become one factor shaping ... 
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the design space available to organisational actors, within which choice and negotiation over 
organisational outcomes may be made. 
22
 
Technology suppliers and their products can be seen as two important sources of this stabilisation process for 
adopting organisations, in the sense that the purchasing of a technological package actually creates constraints on 
choice. For instance, purchasing the product involves acquiescing in the pre-emptive 'choices' and knowledge of 
the supplier which are embodied in that product. Given the predominance of a few large technology suppliers in 
certain sectors, this degree of constraint may be significant. 
23
 Similarly, „much new technology...is itself 
produced by a few firms and sold as a package to others, seriously limiting the scope for local management or 
employee manoeuvre‟. 24 
 The material facticity of technology is an important component of the socio-technical 
ensemble. As McLoughlin and Clark 
25
 have observed: 
the ways in which technology can or cannot be used, cannot themselves be reduced to these 
subjective perceptions. That is, the technical capabilities and characteristics will provide 
material influences which enable certain subjective interpretations of, for instance, how tasks 
can be allocated or work organized, and constrain others-at least in the sense that their 
plausibility is more likely to be prone to challenge (emphasis in original). 
The principle that no single explanatory category of analysis is acceptable in analysing social 
systems 
26
 must be maintained in the analysis of technology. If the analysis decays into using a 
single category, the charge of determinism may be made. The challenge which is taken up in 
the next section of the paper is to understand the emergence and consolidation of a particular 
socio-technical ensemble, where the exercise of power played an important but not exclusive 
role in shaping action. 
KNOWLEDGE AND POWER AT BUTLER CO.
KNOWLEDGE AND POWER AT 
TOBACCO CO. 
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Butler Co. is a UK- based company which retails its products into a mature and highly 
competitive market. The company has changed ownership twice in the past ten years, and has 
been „de-layered‟ and rationalised, resulting in a very flat organisation structure. The sales 
team is charged with two key objectives: to increase market share and to gather marketing 
information. As a senior manager expressed the matter: 
It has been a strategy of the company to work in the most efficient way possible, and a 
necessity of the market. We cannot afford a complex and rigid administrative structure 
which limits our flexibility, that‟s why the company is driven from the top. All the 
troops have to worry about is doing their job, we pay them well enough for it. I know 
that may sound draconian, but in such a competitive market we cannot afford the luxury 
of pluralism, decisions must be made and acted on as quickly as possible. Information 
technology plays a central role in that, in fact without it would not be possible for us to 
be such an aggressive market - led company. 
 At the senior management level  three themes are constantly reiterated:  the market 
place is highly competitive and volatile, the only way to manage this is through a centralised 
decision making mechanism, and central to the latter is information technology. These themes 
are regularly alluded to throughout the organisation, and are much in evidence in company 
documentation. The pivotal role played by IT is illustrated by the following observation of a 
member of the Board: 
We meet once a month, in our game you have to, a brand that you have invested millions in can 
go down the tubes in a matter of weeks, so you need to be in a position to change tack very 
rapidly. These days you also have to watch out for legislation and public opinion, the tide is 
against us now so we have to be very careful. Not proliferating these issues across the company 
means that decisions are taken quickly. The technology allows us to get all the information 
needed and fast, we don‟t have to wait around for it, at the worst its only a day old, it allows us 
to control every aspect of our business very quickly. I suppose you could summarise our 
approach as market led, rapid response using information technology. 
 Senior managers were at pains to emphasise that, due to „the pressures of the 
competitive market place‟, centralised decision making is vital as decisions have to be made 
rapidly. 
Using Information Technology  
Lets make no bones about it, the technology is the eyes and ears of the organisation. I suppose 
the best analogy is that of a brain, the brain is the Board and the technology is the nerves, 
gathering information and passing it to the brain. Impulses from the brain can also travel very 
quickly to where something needs to be done. Despite the fact we are a trading company we are 
kept profitable and in business by the technology (CEO).  
 
Butler Co.‟s IT-based management information system was described as „state of the 
art‟ by  a number of managers and other staff. It is highly confidential, only the most senior 
managers being allowed access to the data and analyses which are produced: 
We paid a lot of money for the MIS to be written, and it does some very hard sums! The market 
analysis section is particularly complicated and uses all the goodies-factor analysis, cluster 
analysis, data mining, you name it. The best part is that this is all brought together into a 
simple-to-use clicky-button front end. They [the senior management team] sit there in their 
meetings huddled over the group decision support system; its rather like a cross between NASA 
and a witches huddle (Technical Director).  
 A strong emphasis is placed by senior management upon using the IT for analytical 
purposes. Due to the wide geographical spread and diversity of the organisation, it is contended  
by them that it is only possible for information-and the organisation itself- to be controlled 
through IT by a small central group of senior people: 
As an organisation we are structured around the insight that information is our key resource. 
That information flows to the centre and forms the basis of our management decisions. We draw 
this information from right across the organisation, and bring it together into an integrated 
whole. The senior management team then interpret this and the decisions made are fed back out 
through the system to the individual units; this can be from a whole division right down to an 
individual employee. I don‟t see any way that a modern organisation can be responsive and 
provide a significant return on investment without taking this approach (Marketing Director). 
The Golden Handcuff’s  
The management style of Butler Co. is Tayloristic and autocratic: 
We employ them [the employees] to do what they are told, I don‟t see anything wrong with that. 
We make it perfectly clear before they join that that‟s the way it is, they are paid to do their job 
and do it well, and that‟s it. Quite frankly, we pay them well above the odds, and we never have 
any shortage of applicants (Human Resources Director). 
 During a training session for new sales reps the Divisional Director used the analogy of 
the reps being the „worker bees‟ of the organisation. The implication was that they were paid to 
work and not to think, the latter being the province of senior management. As a sales rep 
commented: 
We are just the hired hands, we are paid well to do our job well, and that‟s it. They [senior 
management] don‟t want us to take part in the running of the company in any way. I suppose 
that‟s the deal: „We pay you well to do your job and to keep your nose out of our business‟. As 
long as you can detach your self esteem from your job, then its bearable, otherwise you can end 
up feeling demoralised. 
 The remuneration package that Butler Co. offers its sales reps is relatively generous, 
and, as  a rep pointed out, “it‟s the „golden handcuffs‟-you rapidly become used to the money, 
and can‟t leave, and they know it, so they‟ve got you by the balls”. Put simply, the 
remuneration package secures compliance: 
Of course that‟s the case, it suits the organisation. We are here to maximise the profits to our 
shareholders, nothing else. The shareholders benefit greatly from our approach, but so do the 
employees. Their emotional and spiritual welfare is not our problem, naturally we hope they 
enjoy their jobs, our approach is „do your job well and we‟ll give you generous pay, pensions, 
bonuses and holidays‟. Simple, that keeps most of our reps very happy (HR Director). 
 The number of line managers between a rep and the CEO is only three. They work from 
home, and so do not require any costly office space; their interaction with the organization is 
strongly mediated by information technology. 
Sales reps: working practices         
 The marketing database and associated systems are linked to the reps via a specially 
designed computer terminal which resembles a small lap top. The terminal has a data 
communication port and external modem, at the end of each day the data recorded is 
downloaded to the company‟s marketing database. The terminal calls for the rep to enter all the 
details of the call, such as the brands sold, competitor brand details etc., by cycling through a 
number of defined screens, each of which must be completed before the next may be accessed. 
When all have been completed, the call may be closed. 
 
For the majority of sales reps the working day starts at 8am, with the first job of the 
morning being to turn on the terminal and log in, which takes the rep to the outlet screen. As 
noted earlier, the rep operates on a cycle basis agreed with the Area Manager; the calls for the 
current working day being displayed on the terminal. The reps work with the terminal 
constantly, thus it is not possible to meaningfully divide their work into parts, one involving the 
use of the terminal and one not: their work is constantly mediated by it. The terminal is not seen 
by the reps as a thing in itself: „In the old days you would fill in a form with a biro, now you use 
the terminal- its the same thing. The terminal is harmless in itself, the problem is that 
management just don‟t trust us‟ (Sales rep). The terminal program guides the reps through each 
screen, and  calls cannot be closed until all the screens have been completed: 
The terminal makes sure that you do all that the company wants for each call, you can‟t close a 
call until all the data is entered. But that‟s not enough, the terminal tells you what to do, but in a 
broad way. The points system is like a fine control, the company tells us exactly what should be 
done to the finest detail. The terminal gathers all the information to make sure you have done it, 
and you know that you will be measured against the points system and rewarded or punished 
depending on how you did. Its rather clever really, on the face of it you work from home, but in 
reality its just like having your manager standing right beside you every second of the day from 
the time you log on to the time you download your data (Sales rep.). 
 
This cycle is repeated throughout the working day. Once the allotted number of calls 
have been completed the rep returns home. There are then a number of „house keeping‟ 
procedures which  must be carried out. Finally, the terminal is  connected to the modem and 
recharger to download data and recharge batteries for the next day. This whole process takes 
between one and two hours. 
Surveillance and Control 
Once a week each sales rep receives a print out of his/her performance for the previous week 
from his/her Area Manager. The analysis compares each rep against the others in the region on 
key factors such as days worked, surveys made (sales calls), „out of stocks‟ encountered, „out 
of stocks‟ rectified, new introductions (new brands taken on by the retailer). This is also 
captured in simple statistics. Often the Area Manager will include comments on the weekly 
performance. A rep observed: 
It makes me laugh, 1984 isn‟t a work of fiction-its our management handbook. Big Brother 
watches us all the time, we have only one objective, determined by the party, and any 
contradictory thoughts we may have we must submerge with doublethink. But the sweetest 
paradox of this is our desperate compliance, we engage in this insanity because our very 
lifestyle depends on it, we cannot believe this is the best way to work, and yet we must preserve 
this way of working because we do so well out of it. We are trapped by our own greed !  
 
Once a month there is a meeting is of all the reps within a sales territory, led by the Area 
Manager. The first part of the meeting discusses the territory‟s overall performance over the 
month. The key indicator for reps is the product of the „brands introduced‟ scores and the 
relevant retail outlet grades. The scale begins at zero and increases, zero being the best 
possible. The exact nature of the calculation is not revealed, though it is said to be a complex 
equation based on various marketing factors. One Area Manager commented „They [the reps] 
don‟t need to know exactly how its calculated, all they need to know is that it is essentially the 
product of the outlet grade and the brand points, that‟s enough‟. The main focus of the meetings 
is upon comparisons between the performance of the reps within the sales territory, between 
territory and territory within a sales region, and between regions. 
 Area Managers have access to whatever level of detail they require; for example, they 
can „drill into‟ the results of an individual sales rep in any region of the company. Thus 
comparative and absolute performance measurement is used as a form of surveillance and 
control, and  emphasises the (electronic) Panoptic eye of senior management: „if reps in one 
area can see that other reps are out performing them, they are more likely to believe that it can 
be done than if their sales targets are purely set by managers at head office‟ (Area Manager). As 
the formulae and means used to calculate these figures are not open to them, the degree to and 
ways in which head office managers intervene is not known to the sales reps: 
The metrics have two functions, the first and most obvious is to put pressure on the reps to work 
hard, that‟s why the bonuses are so closely linked to them. The second function is that 
information is perhaps the most important resource to the company. The reps are our front line, 
and most important source of information about our brands and customers. We have to ensure 
that they gather all the information we need, so the metrics are also used to put pressure on them 
to do so (Distribution Director). 
 
The first main component of the analysis is a comparison between reps within a given 
territory. The figures for each rep are broken down on a weekly basis and presented in a table 
which shows  comparisons between reps. The performance of each rep is commented upon and 
discussed openly in detail at the monthly meeting with the Area Manager. Other reps listen in, 
but rarely offer any comments. There are two main possibilities: reps are either praised for their 
good performance, which typically takes only a short amount of time, and is usually presented 
as a „lesson to us all‟ by the Area Manager, or „poor performance‟ triggers a  detailed 
investigation into the particular problem areas and an attempt to understand why it has 
occurred. The Area Manager issues both warnings and advice in order to rectify „the problem‟. 
 The language commonly used by the Area Managers is admonishing and formal, for 
example „This isn‟t meant to be a team building exercise. We are here to see how we did and 
how we can do better. The reps already have the carrot, I supply the stick‟ (Area Manager). As 
one rep captured the experience: 
Its rather like standing naked in front of a group of strangers-they can see all your embarrassing 
details. Though you know these people, its done in a way so you feel exposed and ashamed. If 
you have done well then you are exalted, and the others are encouraged to follow your good 
example, which is just as bad. The whole process is rather like getting an enema in public, you 
know its going to happen, all you wish is for your turn to be over as quickly as possible. 
 
As noted earlier, the Area Manager also compares his/her sales territory‟s performance 
with that of other territories in the region over the relevant time period. If a particular territory 
has performed especially well or poorly, then the reasons for this are explored. Finally, a 
comparison is made across regions, with a focusing down to greater detail where this is 
perceived as necessary. 
 In addition to these monthly meetings the Area Manager visits each rep‟s patch twice a 
month. In the first of these, he/she will spend half a day with each rep, in a „passive observer‟ 
role: 
The purpose of these visits with the reps is to see how they do their job. What I am interested in 
is „Are they professional in their work and how could they do better?‟. At the end of a visit I will 
spend some time with the rep offering advice on procedures and sales techniques, and, if its 
needed, pull them up short on areas where they are doing badly (Area Manager). 
 
The observations and recommendations of the visit are written up and formally 
submitted to the rep, with a copy being placed on his/her file. A second, monthly, „field visit‟ 
by the Area Manager is then undertaken to the rep‟s patch. This time the rep is not informed of 
when the visit will take place and the particular outlets to be visited, and it acts, of course, as a 
„spot check‟: 
On the field visit I am checking up to see that the data the rep has entered for each outlet is 
accurate. Since our company relies so much on quality information, there is a need for some 
form of quality control. I also want to make sure that he is pushing as hard as possible and 
setting ambitious but achievable targets for himself (Area Manager). 
 
After the field visit the Area Manager produces a report summarising what has been 
found, along with comments and recommendations. These are submitted to the rep, and a copy 
is placed on his or her file. As a rep observed: 
The field visits are there to make sure you do your work. You never know when or where you 
are being watched ! You have some control over the terminal, and can skip calls by entering the 
data though you haven‟t been to the outlet. But the field visits, well, you are always worried 
about where he will go and what he will see, but that‟s the idea, to make you paranoid ! You are 
being watched ! 
 
Usually, the sales rep will respond to these visits and any recommendations/comments 
raised through a memo to the Area Manager. As all the aforementioned are formal documents 
which are placed on the rep‟s file, they normally elicit only formal responses: “When you 
respond to these reports, you can never criticise or make excuses, you just „doff your cap‟ and 
say „Yes sir, I agree with everything you say, and I‟ll try harder next time‟” (sales rep.) 
DISCUSSION: POWER AND THE SOCIO TECHNICAL ENSEMBLE 
The social construction of technology and interpretation(s) of what a technology is and can do are 
essentially political processes. Bijker 
27
, although recognising this, does not fully  address the ways in which this 
exercise of power in the social construction of technology is achieved through the restriction of access to debate 
and the socio technical ensemble shaping process. 
 In Butler Co, as in the great majority (if not all) organisations, occupations, groups and individuals enjoy 
different degrees of power as a result of their position in the organisational hierarchy. Thus, senior management 
are a more powerful group in Butler Co. than the reps or area managers and determine the degree to which they 
contribute to the social construction of the company and its technology. Through controlling the socio technical 
ensemble, senior management controlled the structuring and working practices of the organisation. 
 A telling example of the way in which senior management acted to limit debate within Butler Co. was 
their enactment of the organisation‟s environment 28. Talk of the „necessity‟ to increase or preserve profitability 
levels, market share, etc., in the face of environmental turbulence and intense competition was used by senior 
management to legitimise the need for internal responsiveness and rapid (senior management) decision making 
29
. 
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This served to restrict the forms of argument and action which were deployed, and, although some of the specific 
decisions of senior management were occasionally questioned, this view of the organisation‟s environment and its 
implications was not. In addition, a „Golden Handcuffs‟ employment strategy was  deployed; summarised by a 
sales rep. as „we pay you well, so put up and shut up‟. The voices of middle management and the reps in shaping 
the socio technical ensemble were effectively silenced. 
 The generous remuneration package was effective in limiting resistance by creating dependence. Once 
individuals had come to rely on a particular income they did not wish to jeopardise it. This could be viewed as 
creating an ethical dilemma. If, for example, senior managers had created dependence by supplying and 
encouraging the taking of hard drugs, then this would no doubt have been seen as both illegal and morally 
unacceptable. But as in this instance no law has been broken, and the victims of this dependency relationship do 
not wish to complain, and in any event have no avenue with which to do so, it remains unquestioned. The 
possibility of alternative or competing narratives were silenced by securing the acquiescence of the reps. 
 It was within the socio technical ensemble that the nature of the relationships between the actors and 
between the actors and the technology are set out: senior management were the decision makers, the reps carried 
out the instructions given to them, and middle management ensured that the reps complied. Middle management 
utilised the pecuniary dependency of the reps  and techniques of surveillance to enforce and ensure compliance.  
 The organisation‟s information system was designed and deployed to enable and 
enshrine this set of relations by gathering and channelling information to senior management, 
and directly conveying their requirements to the individuals concerned. Technology was the 
key means through which these relations were actualised and surveillance formed the central 
plank of management‟s  control strategy. Sewell 30 found in his case studies that two main 
forms of surveillance were deployed in teamworking: 
vertical and horizontal. Vertical surveillance is achieved through electronic monitoring of 
individual work and performance and approaches the conditions of reach and immediacy 
demanded by panopticism…Horizontal surveillance, operating in nominally autonomous work 
teams, is enacted through peer group scrutiny…Although this is a direct form of surveillance, it 
is not panoptic, as equals, rather than superiors, perform it. 
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In Butler Co, as we saw, vertical surveillance was deployed „with a vengeance‟, but  horizontal 
surveillance is not used, rather a „divide and rule‟ strategy. This is in part an outcome of the 
reps working from homes which are located at some distance from each other, and rarely 
getting together apart from  the monthly meetings. What is more, managers  compare the 
productivity and effectiveness of individual reps and feedback  information to them without 
their being able to assess whether these comparisons are valid or accurate. This isolation also,  
of course, reduces the possibility of resistance. Vertical surveillance occurs through both the 
„electronic panopticon‟ and the covert visits of Area Managers to the reps‟ territories. No effort 
is made to conceal these surveillance practices, indeed they are presented as essential for the 
effective management of the organisation.  
 The material aspects of technology are important in the sense that they both enable and 
constrain the ensemble, but the ensemble, and the resulting technological frame, is primarily 
the outcome of the actions of certain individuals in creating and recreating the organisation, 
rather than constructions of knowledge of what a technology is and what it can do.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 In Butler Co. closure and stabilisation has occurred: the socio technical ensemble is established and acts 
to define the relationships between individuals, hierarchical levels, and the role of technology. The ensemble 
functions on a number of interdependent levels: 
Knowledge, where the organisation is defined through the process of enacting its reality.  
Structure, through the dissemination of rules and resources across the organisation. This  also defines the 
organisational actor-groups and their relationships and the technology which is to be deployed. 
 Practice, where the content, ranking  and timing of activities is defined. 
 The enactment, and resulting organisational form, is the outcome of the exercise of power, and 
consequently power can be seen to act on all of these levels. The form that technology takes is also an outcome of 
this enactment, being used in this instance to enforce  senior managers‟ dominance through surveillance practices. 
Thus the technology-in-use is a material reflection of the power relations embodied in the enacted organisation. 
 In Butler Co., then, our argument is that power resides with senior management, being 
enforced through tight control, measurement and surveillance. As Beniger has noted, this mode 
of control was common in many companies and industries of the industrial revolution. 
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  Thus, 
in this company at least, innovations in information technology appear to be constrained  to 
finding new ways of implementing old methods of managerial control.   
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